

called a "senior-level" at which he

On November 23 Helms outlined the Agency's ~~investigative~~ responsibility [SSC, Book I, p 25]. At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexico, Central America, and Panama, in charge of the Agency's initial investigative efforts. [HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-112, Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p 10]. Scelso asserted that he was charged with the investigation ~~on the basis of two factors~~. First, he had prior experience in conducting ~~investigations~~ ^{CIA} security investigations and secondly, Oswald had ~~been~~ recently observed ^{in Mexico} by CIA surveillance, ~~already~~ ^{Scelso's} operational concern. [SSC Book I, p 25, HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-112] *
* Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp 9-10)

Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research & Analysis for the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff ~~different~~ ^{in character} ~~Scelso's responsibility~~ ^{not as a} ~~mandate~~ ^{rather} to investigate but "to coordinate traffic (code facilitation, telegram & teletyping consideration) for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world ..."
[HSCA Class. Depo of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p 9].

40

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deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p15
wherein Rocca states that responsibility
shifted from Scelso to CI staff on January
12, 1964). Helms testified that the
shift in responsibility was a logical
development because the investigation
had begun to ~~take~~ on broader tone.
[Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,
p14, see also HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso,
5/16/78, p138]

Raymond Rocca expanded on Helms
reasoning when he testified before the
Committee that the shift in responsibility
was partially ~~caused by~~ ^{caused by} the establishment
of the Warren Commission. [HSCA Class.
Depo of Raymond Rocca, pp12-13], Rocca
added to his reasoning:

it was entirely appropriate in the
GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would
have that responsibility for the Agency
investigation. But the minute
you had a Commission set up
outside the line obviously had to
(over)

be the Director, and from the Director
to his Chief of Operations overseas,
because the spread involved then all
of the divisions. There you had Mr.
[Whitten] being asked to sign off
on calls that had to do with the
Netherlands, with U.K., with
Australia, and it would have seemed
to me utterly administratively
simply a hybrid monster.

HSCA STAFF. FILED Dep. of

R. Rocca 7/17/90

P12

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Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

However, ^{at times} ~~in some instances, risking the exposure of~~ ^{concern for protecting its} the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting ^{relevant} ~~the~~ information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's ^{effort} ~~to~~ protect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not~~ ^{have} effect ~~on~~ the quality of the information to ^{which} ~~the~~ the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) ^{made the} in some instances ^{As a result} the Agency ~~would make~~ unilateral decisions ^{to withhold from} ~~regarding the release of~~ ^{access to CIA} materials ^{by} the Commission. (Scetso dep. p.158)

Two areas of concern ~~to this Committee~~ in which the protection of agency sources and methods were ~~an~~ ^{an} issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved ~~and~~ ^{and} impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:

- 1) ^{Withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff} ~~the~~ photosurveillance and telephonic surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station
- 2) As a related consideration, ^{effects of the} the controversy sur-

This Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency is desirous to protect its sensitive sources and methods. It is the opinion of the Warren Commission investigators that these are:

rounding^u photograph now referred to as that
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined ~~_____~~
herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of
sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was
evident from the ~~in~~ⁱⁿception of the Warren Commission.
Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first
to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.
p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence re-
ports which derived from all our sources, in-
cluding technical sources, including the tele-
phone intercept and the information gotten
from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for
example, which corresponded almost exactly
with the information from the telephone inter-
cepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by
examination of the background to the first major CIA
report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey
Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ^{ 31 Jan memo } (Cite.) Much of the informa-
tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was
based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification
of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The ^{CIA} policy ~~_____~~ limiting Warren Commission know-
ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early
as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from
CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the
Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

phone taps, in order to protect your continuing ~~ops~~. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence / ^{Special Investigations Group} Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~man~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico. Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City, see CIA ²SCI-3/779/510) O'Neal's memorandum ^{shows} ~~indicated~~ that he discussed this matter with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI-sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

the form of this presentation ^{was to be in a form that would} ~~be~~ protect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.
(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City, ~~of the Commission's source,~~

~~of the Commission's source,~~ Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the [Mexican authorities] and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, ~~of the Commission's source,~~)

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period ^(CIA 11/28/63, CSCI 3/779/5-13 1/24/64) ~~on a regular basis~~ ^{Furtherman} as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council Director McGeorge Bundy, ^{had been made} aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these taps Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. ^[cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]

1/98

^{unwillingness}
The CIA's ~~unwillingness~~ to inform the Warren Commission
of the above-described surveillance operations ~~of the~~

~~in the early stages of its in-~~
vestigation the ~~transcription of~~ ~~conversations and~~

~~those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials~~ is a source

of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an ^{Agency} ~~attitude~~

^{policy designed to skew in its favor the form and}
tude on the Agency's part to ~~deliberately~~ ~~omit~~

substance ~~of~~ ^{the CIA felt uncomfortable} ~~information~~ ~~provided~~

the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep. ^{P.T.}) This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it,

even those ^{facts} which might have meant exposing certain sensi-
tive operations to the Commission.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA
provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that
chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during
September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

~~did not~~ ^{that} mention ~~that~~ Oswald's various conver-
sations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had

been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore,

that memorandum ~~did not~~ ^{that} mention ~~that~~ the CIA

had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the

conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico ^{Armas} which the CIA had also tapped and

transcribed.

On February 1, 1964 Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that ~~at least~~ ^{his writing} as of ~~the date~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 ^{letter} whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in ~~it~~ of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations.

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission ^{for} indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

V. During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City. ^{Scott} provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: _____ P)

However, ^{April 9} prior to ~~the date~~ it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals ~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had in its~~ possessed ~~ed~~ transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. ^{Dorticos-Armas} These conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ~~and~~ concerned Silvia Durn's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (^{memo} cite?). ~~On March 12, 1964,~~ Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, ^{stating} ~~that~~ that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives' to review ~~this~~ this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City. ^{Supra} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocca's testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions ~~concerning~~ ^{concerns} Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary ~~of~~ of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephone intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ★ insert p 28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion ^{write was} he ~~writes~~ is based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears ~~on~~ ^{on} ~~the~~ ^{there is no}

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, ~~Slawson~~ had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis ~~would~~ have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or criticism of the Mexican police summary report. *above cited* *★ Insert p29*

Insert from p29 *★* As ~~March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary police report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:~~ *As Slawson reveals,* *suspect of a*

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1872) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning is ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as Oswald ^{was} at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ^{the CIA had twice} ~~on two separate~~ ~~occasions~~ definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy ^{were} ~~was~~ established as the result of the telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they articulated one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts ~~refer~~^{refer} to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed.

(Item I)
The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson ~~found it~~^{found it} necessary to request ~~the~~^{the} source of the information, he had not been

provided that source which in this ~~intercept~~ ^{by the CIA} telephone
intercept ~~intercept~~

The first Coleman-Slawson request ~~was~~ ^{(Item Number Two) the above listing}
~~tends to show~~ ^{tends to show} the Commission ~~that they did not~~ ^{not} had ~~been~~ ^{not been}
given access, ~~to the intercepts~~ ^{the} to ~~the intercepts~~

concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated
~~by the question set forth above~~). Moreover, this request
~~could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been~~
~~given access to any of the subject materials.~~
^{Agency transcripts}
^{indicates the Commission had not been given complete access to the relevant}

The second request, {item number three of the above
listing} reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman
conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing
of monies ~~was~~ discussed had not as of April 2 been provided
to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested
the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. ~~at~~ ^{the} the March 12, 1964
meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-
presentatives. (Cite.) ^{the record of the meeting}

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated
their concern for receiving complete access to all materials
relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire
investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is
a conclusion that he went there for the purpose
of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-
spiracies, etc. took place.

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance operations and English translations of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. Scott indicated that his staff ~~at that point~~ ^{immediately} began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed ^{that} all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded ~~in~~

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote ^{Thomas Karamessios Assistant DDP} to ~~Thomas Karamessios~~, ~~Assistant DDP~~, regarding the circumstances ^{by which} ~~of this photograph~~ ^{was obtained} by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin ~~requested~~ requested that the Commission be ^{told} ~~informed~~ of the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph if that information ^{was} ~~was~~ available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone, Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret Service ^{since November 22, 1963} that the CIA had disseminated several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret Service ~~since November 22, 1964~~. Rankin requested copies of these reports and other materials. ^{These materials included} Three ^{CIA} ~~three~~ cables ~~that were~~ ^{which} concerned ~~with~~ the photograph of the individual ^{originally identified} ~~depicted~~ by the ~~Mexico City Station as~~ ^{by the Mexico City Station as} ~~being~~ Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.

~~Although the CIA had disseminated this information in a~~
un~~known~~ ~~to the Commission~~, ^{by the CIA} among the materials disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), ~~a copy of which was transmitted to~~ ^{to} the Secret Service. That cable concerned the Dor~~is~~ ⁴¹⁰⁵-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City ~~at the time of the~~ assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964,
"The [redacted] which the Warren Commission *had unknowingly requested* [redacted] access to telephonic surveillance production) (as discussed in the preceding section), the *Similarly disclosure* [redacted] of the photosurveillance operations, *to the Warren Commission had begun* [redacted] to cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous ~~sex~~ photographs which are not of Oswald..."
(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

VIII. Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination, that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, for [REDACTED] 15

for [REDACTED] in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may also ~~be~~ be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assassination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ~~Station~~ and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Commercial Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City (Dispatch HMMW 11935). ~~the Station in Mexico City~~ *insert*

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first ~~reported~~ *recorded by* the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, ~~Joseph Langosch~~ *Joseph Langosch*, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, ~~reported~~ *reported* the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

This dispatch reported that
(over)

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 ~~had~~^{was} ~~been~~ asked if Oswald ~~was~~ known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told ~~Swenson~~^{Langosch} as ~~recorded in the May 5 memorandum~~ that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." (cite Mays memo)
~~Swenson~~^{Langosch} thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico ^{during January 1963} and departure, ~~for Cuba~~^{for Cuba shortly after the assassination (cite Mays memo)}

On May 7, 1964, ~~Swenson~~^{Langosch} recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

On May 8 ^{Langosch} ~~S. [redacted]~~ further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. ^{Langosch} ~~S. [redacted]~~ paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information ^{LANGOSCH} ~~[redacted]~~ had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing." (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of ~~_____~~ ^{Langoch's} May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ^{were} ~~are~~ set forth. However, that attachment ^{made} ~~makes~~ no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, ^{access to} ~~information~~ the questions used in ~~_____~~ ^{Langoch}'s interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw ~~_____~~ ^{Langoch's}'s May 5 memorandum. The only mention of ~~Calderon~~ ^{Calderon} was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." However, Willens was not shown the ~~_____~~ ^{Langoch} memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

continued after p 51
Calderon

Need a better transition into this section

As discussed in an earlier section of this report,

the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's production from its telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City until an advanced stage in its investigation. The record reflects that Mssrs. Willens, Slawson, and Coleman did not review the production until they visited Mexico City on April 9, 1964. At that time, they reviewed a number of ^{telephone} intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. These intercepts included one call to the Soviet Embassy on September 27, believed to have been made by Oswald, two calls made by Silvia Duran from the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassy, made by an unidentified caller. (Cite Slawson memo of April 21, 1964.)

On September 28 the intercept operation recorded a call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate. (Cite.)

On October 1 the intercept operation recorded two calls made by a person later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.)

The Commission representatives were also supplied with the CIA intercepts of ~~the~~ two conversations that transpired between the Cuban President Dorticos and the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been

Conversations
don't
transpire
at least
I don't
think
they do

give
date

Confusing
transition
from
previous
page.

It's very hard for
me to see what
point is being
made on these pages.

offered money while at the Cuban Embassy, and the general state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22, 1964, pp. 45-46).

The Committee's

which memo you refer to this to much earlier to expect reader to remember it.

A review of CIA files ~~evidence~~ ^{memorandum regarding} corroborates ~~of~~ Slawson's ~~recounting~~ ^{supporting Slawson's record is} the telephone intercepts provided to and reviewed by the Commission. ~~One~~ One CIA document, a blind memorandum ~~is~~ entitled "Material from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These included ~~three of the~~ ^{conversations} ~~conversations~~ of September 27 listed above, one call of September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of October ? - ~~check~~ ^{document}

Why not just say that Agency has acknowledged that Calderon conversation was not given to WCC.

While this does not correspond to the listing of calls set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish that no calls ~~made on~~ ^{intercepted from} November 22, 1963 were shown to the Warren Commission.

In addition, this document corroborates the showing of the two Dorticas-Armas conversation ^S of November 26, 1964 to the Warren Commission

The Committee has queried former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren

Calderon

and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed ~~to~~ to be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. ~~for~~ ^{have} It would demonstrated that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to Cuban Intelligence, ^{the} ~~and~~ ^{Services} and that Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

true
but
sound a
bit
stilted.
try
to
modify.

Regarding ^{Calderon's} ~~the~~ possible association with the CIA,

~~the Committee has examined Calderon's file.~~ ~~MMW~~ ~~the~~ ^{Agency}

Files reviewed

reveals no ostensible connection between Calderon and

the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A

September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be in a position to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. (HMMW/1935, Sept. 1, 1963)

Has
CIA
family
been
asked
about
this?

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear. (HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidenced an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

The Committee has queried the author of the above-cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section."

David Ronis, the ~~dispatch's~~ author, was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was ~~then~~ responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons.

often
what purpose is served by this sentence?

response to these requests. It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August 31, 1978)

Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August 9, 1978, p. 136; Rocca, Dep. p.148, July 17, 1978; ^{Largosch} ~~Sullivan~~, Interview of August __, Piccolo, Interview of __)

Thus, the Agency's file ^{in Calderon} and the testimony of former CIA employees ^{have} revealed ^{between and} no connection ~~to~~ Calderon ~~to~~ the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete, ^{absence from Calderon's 201 file} the most glaring omission being ~~the testimony of~~ Calderon's ^{her} cryptic remarks following the assassination of President Kennedy.

Should make a formal request for a written response

^{MM}
~~AMMUG~~/1

so largely
As cited with regard to Luisa Calderon, a defec-

tor from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the DGI on April 21, 1964 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (OTTA IN 68894, 24 April 64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H. Langosch, went to Canada to meet A-1, debrief him, and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States. (See supra cite.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's^{OSC} debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff from the Chief of Station in Ottawa, Canada. Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. (Contract Approving Officer memo, 6 May 64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that AMMUG-1

*It is now known that A-1 did provide significant leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is further apparent that little of this information was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission. Therefore, the possibility exists that A-1 had provided other information to the CIA that was relevant to the Warren Commission's work but that which was not properly reported to the Commission.

is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B (OTTA IN 68894 24 April 64) ^{which} ~~This section~~ was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April 64)

~~identified for the CIA~~
A-1 knew ~~who were~~ the Cuban ~~Intelligence~~ officers assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he initially identified Alfredo Mirabal, Manuel Vega, and Rogelio Rodriguez and the ~~Commercial~~ attache as DGI officers posted at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debriefing of A-1, 30 April 64)

This is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case."

(Dispatch UFGW-5035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Cite supra.)

Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has

Staff member that was the symbol for worked extensively with the Agency files system *told a Committee* ~~believed~~ this notation ~~to stand for~~ the CIA component *known as* Special In-

Has CIA been asked to respond in writing to this issue? ~~telligence. Other CIA representatives believed the nota-~~
~~tion to stand for the CIA component Special Intelligence.~~

Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated _____, it ~~as~~ stated

Quote Barbara's memo.

The Agency has been unable to locate this document and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-1's case officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied *about* ~~regarding~~ Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August 21, 1978) he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not *interview*

^{A-1}
recall that ~~AMMUG~~ provided any other information on Oswald's
contact with the DGI other than the ^{set forth in the 10 of May 5, 7, and 8,} memoranda discussed
^{as discussed herein}
herein. (Cite ~~Calderon~~ ^{Swenson} interview.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance of informa-
tion that ^{A-1} ~~AMMUG~~ provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the
Committee has attempted to locate ^{A-1} ~~AMMUG~~. The CIA has also
attempted to locate ^{A-1} ~~AMMUG~~ (give date of separation from CIA)
but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts.

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information ^{A-1} ~~AMMUG~~ may
have supplied the CIA about Oswald. ^{and} ~~On~~ the basis of
the written record ^{with the} ~~the~~ Agency, except for the Calderon
episode, ^{provided} the Warren Commission with all information
of investigative significance. ^A A broader question remains

however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to
the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the Washington,
D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the
Commission. ^{Giving due consideration to} ~~Even considering~~ the CIA's serious concern
for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was
not disclosed ^{prevented} ~~foreclosed~~ the Warren Commission from exercising
a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1

as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On
this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency
unilaterally rejected the ^{possibility of exercising this} option. ~~It should not~~
~~have done so.~~ The CIA did not face, in A-1's case, the
enormous problems establishing bona fide as it did with Nosenko.

^{I see your last sentence dealt w/ this. Good.}
~~Especially~~ In light of the establishment of A-1's bone fide
(Cite Langosch's quote supra), his proven reliability and
his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, ^{this}
~~option~~ ^{option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission}
~~It should have at the very least, had the opportunity for such consideration.~~

Give
background
expanding
skeptical
re CIA
inability

Confusing

Note:
sources
reliability
consideration
present in
Nosenko
case were
not applicable
here

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep. pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

ambiguous
+ probably
unnecessary.
Also, it
didn't make
equation
posed
because,
if it took
CIA 3
months
to
produce info
in
response
to a
request, the
one
week
transmittal
time is
meaningful.

See also
Angleton
dep.

However, ~~in some instances, risking the exposure of~~ ^{at times} ~~the CIA's sensitive~~ ^{concern for protecting its} sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting ~~relevant~~ ^{relevant} information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's ~~effort~~ ^{effort} to protect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~affect~~ ^{which} the quality of the information to ~~the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.~~

(Rankin at p.23) ~~In some instances~~ ^{As a result} the Agency ~~would make unilateral decisions~~ ^{made the} ~~regarding the~~ ^{to withhold or limit} ~~access to CIA~~ ^{materials to be} ~~by~~ the Commission. (See also dep. p.158)

At some point, you should refer to testimony by CIA people who acknowledged this. Two areas of concern ~~in this Committee in which the~~ ^{points} ~~protection of agency sources and methods were at issue dur-~~ ^{concern} ~~ing the Warren Commission investigation involved and im-~~ ⁱⁿ ~~peded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:~~

- 1) ~~Withholding information from the Warren Commission~~ ^{Withholding information from the Warren Commission} ~~pertaining to~~ the photosurveillance and telephone surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station ^{effects of the}
- 2) As a related consideration, the ~~controversy sur-~~ ^{controversy} ~~get better phrasing. Also, this is not~~ ^{really a separate area of concern.}

This Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency is desirous of protecting its sensitive sources and methods. The Warren Commission investigation implicated the CIA in these areas.

rounding ^{the} photograph now referred to as that
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined ~~_____~~
herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of
sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was
evident from the ~~in~~ception of the Warren Commission.
Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first
to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.
p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence re-
ports which derived from all our sources, in-
cluding technical sources, including the tele-
phone intercept and the information gotten
from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for
example, which corresponded almost exactly
with the information from the telephone inter-
cepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by
examination of the background to the first major CIA
report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey
Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ^{31 Jan memo} (Cite.) Much of the informa-
tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was
based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification
of which had been deleted completely from the report.

^{CIA} The policy ~~_____~~ limiting Warren Commission know-
ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early
as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from
CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the
Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

Not a
great fuck
bec it doesn't
take what we
was not going to
be given.

phone taps, in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence ^{Special Investigations Group} Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~man~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 ^{that had been} submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico, ^{and asked him} ~~Papich queried O'Neal~~ whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City, see CIA ^{SCI-3/779/510}) O'Neal's memorandum ^{shows} ~~indicated~~ that he discussed this matter with Scelso, who, in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI--sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

restructure
this
sentence

this
portion of
sentence has
not followed
that well
in light of
the basic
point
in issue.

which would *appropriately*
the form of this presentation ~~was to be in a form that would~~ protect ^{ve of} the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

See also: Angleton Memo.

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City, ~~of the Commission's work,~~

~~Helms testified:~~

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the [Mexican authorities] ²⁴ and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, ~~_____~~)

But, of course, first period had knowledge of + loss of operations

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period ~~_____~~ ^(CIA memo 3/779/510 1/14/64) *Furthermore* ~~_____~~ as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council ^{had been made} Director McGeorge Bundy, ~~was~~ aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these taps Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. *[cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]*

This acts against point you're seeking to make. It puts points on WH + NSC.

1/9A

unwillingness
The CIA's ~~unwillingness~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations ~~in the early stages of the investigation~~ *in the early stages of the investigation* the ~~transcription of the conversations and those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials~~ *is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information provided* the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep.) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those ~~which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the Commission.~~ *facts* *We'll have to give examples.*

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA ~~provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum did not mention~~ *that* *mistaken assumption re 6140 in WC prior to MC trip by WC personnel in April. I believe this was in the WC 3/30 Stanton memo.* Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum ~~did not mention~~ *that* the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that ~~at least~~ ^{his writing} as of ~~the date of the letter~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in ~~the~~ it of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. *Good point.*

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission ^{first} learned of these operations.

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did ^{neither} not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission ^{nor} indicate ^{this source} that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

V. ^{Good!} Title? - shouldn't this be a subsection of the telephone taps?

During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief - ^{Why?} ^{Reason} that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, ^{he} and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, ^{given} ^{at} ^{this} ^{point.} Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, ^{Scott} ^{who} provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: _____ T)

However, ^P ^{April 9} prior to ~~that date~~ it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephone surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals ~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had in its~~ possessed ~~ed~~ transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. ^{Dorticos-Armas} These conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ~~as stated~~ concerned Silvia Durga's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police ^{memo} (cite?). ~~On that date,~~ Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, ^{stating} ~~that he would~~ attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representative ^{to} review ~~this~~ this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City.

^{Supr} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocca's testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.)

lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions ~~concerning~~ ^{concerns} Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary ~~of~~ of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephone intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ~~★ insert p 28~~

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion ~~he writes is~~ ^{wrote was} based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. ~~One again, there is no~~ ^{This memorandum bears}

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis ~~would~~ have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or criticism of the Mexican police summary report. ^{above cited} ~~Insert p29~~

Insert from p29 ~~As of March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City, had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary police report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:~~

As Slawson reveals, ? Logic terminology

suspect of a

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964, Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1872) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. ^{as indicated} Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning ^{is somewhat modification} is ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. [★] Logically, access to the telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy ^{of} requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was ^{later} determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, ^{subsequently} identified by CIA analysts as Oswald ^{was} at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ~~the CIA had twice~~ ^{occasions} definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy ^{were} established as the result of the telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

What about the conversation at 4:16 pm

could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they ^{acknowledged} articulated one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts ^{refer} ~~refer~~ to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

The question ^{by (item 2)} initially posed in the above-referenced

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Obviously, if Slawson ~~found it~~ ^{found it}

necessary to request

~~that~~ the source of the information, he had not been

^{as yet}

You have not as yet really made reference to the complete set of telephonic intercepts.

You should have a copy of the memorandum. This should be combined w/ handwriting.

This is the first time

access to the original material.

- 31 -

by the CIA

provided that source which in this case is the telephone

interviewed herein

The first Coleman-Slawson request

(Item Number Two)

the above listing

tends to show

the Commission

that they did not have

not been

given access, to the intercepts

concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request

Agency transcripts could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, (item number three of the above listing) reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. At the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Cite.)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance operations ^{accompanied with} ~~and~~ English translations ^{for lawyerly type language} of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, Scott indicated ^{immediately} ~~at that point~~ that his staff began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed ^{that} all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents ^{were} ~~had~~ immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded ~~in~~

what the point of this sentence?

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit."

(p. 24)

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining ~~to~~ ^{to} the Duran and Oswald conversations ~~for the period Sept 27 - Oct 1, 1963.~~

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to ^{accurately reasoned} draw conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City, ~~which were not available.~~ It meant that as of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" ^{fr} significantly more precise materials ^{could have been made} ~~were~~ available for analysis by the Commission.

The preceding section (III) ³⁵ is labeled telephonic & photo surveillance, yet there was almost no treatment of photo surveillance. We do have organizational problems. Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission

with the vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement.)

*- Shouldn't alter conversation
be in this section?*

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son. ^{fr} This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. ^{fr} This photograph was one in a series [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. ^{fr} It had been linked by the Mexico City Station Prior to the assassination, ^{fr} to Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. *(cite Helms affidavit in WCR)*

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. ^{WCR II?} (p. 153)

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to **Thomas Karamessios, Assistant DDP**, regarding the ^{regarding both} ~~circumstances of~~ ^{by which} ~~this photograph~~ ^(had been undetermined) by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin ~~requested~~ ^{told} that the Commission be ~~informed~~ ^{told} the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph if that information ~~was~~ ^{was} available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,

Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret Service that the CIA had disseminated ^{since November 22, 1963} several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret

Service since ~~November 22, 1964~~. Rankin requested copies of these ^{These materials included} reports and other materials. ^{CIA} Three ~~cables~~ ^{which} ~~that were~~

concerned ~~with~~ the photograph of the individual ^{originally identified} ~~by the Mexico City Station as~~

~~by the Mexico City Station as~~ Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.

~~Although the Commission was informed that the photograph was~~ ^{what was shown to paymaster? - the photo ~ the individual}

~~unknown to the Commission~~, among the materials ^{by the CIA} disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), a ~~copy of which was transmitted to~~ ⁺¹⁰⁰⁵ the Secret Service. That cable concerned the Dorland-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

this could be confirmed into a notebook

and an explanation of the

this sentence should explicitly state that the materials were made available to the Commission but not to the

as what? what additional report is being made?

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964:

~~the Warren Commission~~ *had unknowingly requested* access to telephonic surveillance production' (as discussed in the preceding section), the ~~the~~ *Similarly disclosure* of the photosurveillance operations, *to the Warren Commission had, figure 1* ~~the~~ *concern* to cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..."
(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

*Check.
The preceding
agency of ~~the memo~~
refers to para. 2
of letter, yet
this particular
letter is just
2 paragraphs
clearly*

This should be included in an earlier section on the taps.

VIII. Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

awkward
The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, for [REDACTED] is
for [REDACTED] in response to
a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on
a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto
suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the
only item in the intercept coverage of the
Cubans and Soviets after the assassination
that contains the suggestion of foreknow-
ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS,
23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com-
ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in-
deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may
also ~~be~~ be interpreted without such a sinister impli-
cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the
Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did
merit serious attention in the months following the assas-
sination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported
to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ^{to} Section and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of ~~the~~ Station in Mexico City (Dispatch HMMW 11935). ^{insert}

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, Harold Swenson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

* This dispatch reported that:
(over) ?

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

Swenson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, *during December 1964* for Cuba.

On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. Swenson paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Swenson's May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ^{were} ~~are~~ set forth. However, that attachment ^{made} ~~makes~~ no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, ^{access to} ~~to look at~~ the questions used in Swenson's interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw Swenson's May 5 memorandum. The only mention of ~~Calderon~~ ^{Calderon} was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." However, Willens was not shown the Swenson memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep. pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

~~At times~~
~~At times~~, in some instances, ~~risking the exposure of~~ the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting ~~relevant~~ information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's ~~effort~~ to protect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not~~ have ~~any~~ effect ~~on~~ the quality of the information to ~~which~~

the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

HSCA Classified Dep. of
J. Lee Rankin 8/17/77
(p.23)

In some instances, as a result the

Agency ~~made the~~ unilateral decisions ~~regarding the~~ ~~access to CIA~~ materials ~~to be~~ by the Commission. (See also p.158)

At one point, you should refer to testimony by [redacted] who acknowledged that:

Two areas of concern to this Committee in which the protection of agency sources and methods were at issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved and impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:

- 1) ~~Withholding information from the Warren Commission~~ ~~pertaining to~~ the photosurveillance and telephone surveillance

operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station

- 2) As a related consideration, the ~~effect of the~~ ~~controversy surrounding~~ Agency's reticence to reveal

Get better phrasing. Also, this is not really a separate area of concern.

THE COMMITTEE HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO WHETHER THE AGENCY IS DESIRING TO PROTECT ITS SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE WARREN COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION OF THESE MATTERS.

arriving
probably
was not
Also, it
don't know
information
posed
because
if it was
CIA's
months
to
provide in
in
response
to a
request, it
one
week
transmitted
time is
important

withhold from limit
HSCA Classified Dep. of
J. Lee Rankin 8/16/76

^{the origin of}
~~rounding~~ photograph now referred to as that
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined ~~herein~~
herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of
sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was
evident from the ⁱⁿception of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first
to reveal all our technical operations." (^{Ibid} Scelso dep.

p.158) ^{But} Scelso ^{aid} further testified that:

We were going to give them intelligence re-
ports which derived from all our sources, in-
cluding technical sources, including the tele-
phone intercept and the information gotten
from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for
example, which corresponded almost exactly
with the information from the telephone inter-
cepts. (~~Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5~~)

^{Ibid}
Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by

examination of the background to the first major CIA

report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey
Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (~~Cite.~~) ^{31 January 1964, Memo} Much of the informa-

tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was
based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification
of which had been deleted completely from the report.

^{CIA}
The policy ~~limiting~~ limiting Warren Commission know-
ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early
as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from
CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the
Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-

^{31 January 1964, Memo}
J. Lee
Rankin for
Richard
Helms

phone taps, in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID

(CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29 Jan 1964)

CIA ~~FOIA~~ Doc # ~~498-204~~, 20 Dec 1963, DIR ~~97829~~ }
426-757 90466

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of ^{as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations w/ the FBI} December 20, 1963. ^{CIA Memorandum for File, 20 Dec 63, Birch O'Neal, in CI soft file materials} In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence ^{Special Investigations Group} Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~man~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of ~~December 9, 1963~~ ^{that had been} submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones ^{and asked him} in Mexico, ~~Papich queried O'Neal~~ whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of the telephone taps. (~~The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City, see CIA SOCI 3/779/510~~)

^{shows} O'Neal's memorandum ~~in which~~ that he discussed this matter with Scelso, ~~who was in Mexico~~ after a discussion with Helms, ^{Scelso} was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI--sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (~~Birch O'Neal~~, ^{CIA} Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, ~~Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald~~ ^{by Birch O'Neal, in CI soft file materials})

which would *was to be in a form that would*
the form of this presentation ~~be in a form that would~~ ^{pro-}
tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

Ibid.

See also: Angleton memo.

IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City; ~~the~~

~~Helms testified:~~

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the [Mexican authorities] and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. *(Helms-Exee Session hearing, pp. 51-52, [redacted])* *Execution testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78 pp 51-52*

But Helms said that the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period [redacted] (CIA [redacted] CSCI 3779/510 1/14/64) Furthermen
Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period ~~regular basis~~ *(CIA [redacted] CSCI 3779/510 1/14/64)* *Furthermen* as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council's Director McGeorge Bundy, ~~was~~ *had been made* aware that the CIA had telephone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these taps Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. *[cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]*

(1/9/80)

The CIA's ^{unwillingness} ~~policy~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations ~~of the above-described surveillance operations~~

~~in the early stages of the investigation~~ the ~~transcription of~~ ~~conversations~~ and

~~those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials~~ is a source

of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an ^{Agency} ~~policy~~ designed to skew in its favor the ~~form and~~ ~~substance~~ of information ~~provided~~ the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep.) ^{the CIA felt uncomfortable}

^{HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, 5/26/78, p 158} This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it,

~~even those which might have meant exposing certain sensi-~~ ^{facts} ~~tive operations to the Commission.~~ ^{We'll have to give examples.}

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA ^{conspicuously} provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that ^{mistaken assumption} chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit ^{in MC} during ^{period} September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum ^{MC trip by W.C. person} ~~did~~ not mention ^{that} ~~that~~ Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum ⁱⁿ ~~did~~ not mention ⁱⁿ ~~that~~ the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico ^{Armas} which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission (~~see above~~) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. ^{CIA FOIA Doc # 498-204, 29 Jan 1964, DIR 97829} On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. ^{JFK Doc No. — } A review of Rankin's letter indicates that ~~at least~~ ^{his writing} as of ~~the date~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in ~~paragraph 1~~ of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of the telephone surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. *Good point.*

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephone surveillance operations in Mexico City. ^{HSCA Classified by dep. of Raymond Rocca, 7/14/78, p89} (~~Rocca dep. p. 89~~) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission ^{first} learned of these operations. *{Ibid}*

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did ^{neither} ~~not~~ reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission ^{for} indicate that ^{this source} ~~it~~ would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). [Ibid]

For CIA # 533-3084, 19 Feb 1964
CIA memorandum, FEB 384, 19 Feb 1964

Warren Commission knowledge of CIA Telephonic Surveillance
that be a subject of
that?

IV A During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. *on that date* At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, ^{Scott} ~~who~~ provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to Mexico City)

Good!

Why?
Please
to
give
out
the
point.

However, ^{April 9} Prior to ~~the~~ it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephone surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum ^{of March 12} reveals ^{who} ~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had~~ in its possession transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. ^{Dorticos-Armas} These conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ~~Slawson~~ concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (cite?). ^{Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964 pp 3, 19, 45-46} Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, ^{stating} ~~that~~ that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives to review this material. (Slawson memo, ^{du} March 12, 1964) ²⁶

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City. ^{Supra} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocca's testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions ^{concerning} ~~to~~ Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, ^(Slawson memorandum March 25, 1964) and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary ~~was~~ of P20 interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. [Ibid]

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephone intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ★ insert p 28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 ^[CD 692] ~~(Cite)~~ wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion ^[Ibid p 2] ~~he writes~~ ^{write, was} is based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears ~~no~~ ^{no}

indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis ~~should~~ have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or criticism of the Mexican police summary report. ^{above cited} ~~Insert p29~~

Insert from p29 ~~As of March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police.~~ ^{As Slawson reveals,} ~~the~~ report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1872) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning is ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as Oswald, was at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ~~it was definitively established~~ definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy were established as the result of the telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. ~~These transcripts~~

Slawson memorandum of April 12, 1964, subj: Intercepts from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 23

What about the conversation 4:16 p.m.

subsequently

(Ibid, p. 43)

the CIA had twice

were (Ibid)

~~could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but as the record indicates they were not then made available.~~

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephone intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they articulated ^{asked} one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador ~~Slawson~~ ^{Slawson & Coleman} subj: Questions Raised by the Amb. Mann File Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts ^{refer} ~~refer~~ to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed [Ibid] ^{by (I & M)}

The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephone intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo April 21, 1964, CIA p. 3223). ^{P1} ~~Necessarily~~ ^{Disagreed (don't like this word)} if Slawson ~~found it~~ ^{found it}

^{necessary to request} ~~the~~ the source of the information, he had not been

^{as yet}

access to the original material
provided that source which in this [redacted] telephone
intercept [redacted]

The first Coleman-Slawson request [redacted] tends to show the Commission [redacted] that they [redacted] had not been given access, [redacted] to the intercepts concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request Agency transcripts could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, Item number three of the above [redacted] reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. at the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Cite [redacted] Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote:-

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. *(Ibid. pp 9-10)*

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance ~~operations and English translations of the same.~~ *accompanied with* ~~of the transcripts~~ In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." *(Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)* *(Ibid.)*

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. Scott indicated that his staff ~~at that point~~ *immediately* began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald *(Ibid.)* Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents ~~were~~ *that* had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion *(pp. 23-24)*. Slawson ~~then~~ concluded ~~in~~

*reflects
Slawson
memo
what
point
memo*

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit."

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining to, respectively, the Duran and Oswald conversations South period Sept 27-Oct 1, 1963.

Slawson memorandum, Apr. 21, 1964, Slawson: Telephonic intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's

denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City, the Commission's denial of the existence of the intercepts.

It meant that as of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had

provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact

"on almost all the crucial points" could have been made significantly more precise

materials ~~were~~ available for analysis by the Commission. [I bid]

What
do
this
call
it adds
a resolution
to the
above quote

Great!

- 35 -

*The preceding matter is based on information & reports
received, yet there were others who testified of what
occurred. He has been given a full hearing.*

Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with ~~the~~ vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement).

*Shouldn't Cuba be mentioned
in this section?*

~~II~~ Mexico City Mystery Man

FBI special Agent Adam showed

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald ~~was shown~~
~~FBI Special Agent Adam~~ a photograph of a man bearing no
Warren Commission Report p —
physical resemblance to her son. This photograph had been
supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City
Station after Agency representatives had searched their files
in an effort to locate information on Oswald. *ECIA DOC DDP4-1555, 25 Mar 1964*
This photograph was one in a series ~~_____~~ the
~~_____~~ resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance
operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. *it*
had been linked by the Mexico City Station Prior to the
assassination. *ibid?* to Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn
affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the
photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4,
1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to
Oswald. *(Note: Name of subject is wrong)*
Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms p — 7

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before
the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under
which she was shown the photograph. *Warren Commission Report p —*
Mrs. Oswald testified that
she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. *WCRI? (p. 153)*

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote
Thomas Karamessinis Assistant DDP
to ~~Thomas Karamessinis, Assistant DDP~~, regarding the
circumstances of ~~this photograph~~ ^{by which} this photograph by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin ~~requested~~ ^{told} that
the Commission be ~~informed~~ ^{told} the identity of the individual
depicted in the photograph if that information ~~was~~ ^{was} available.
[Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc# - 3]

On that same day, in a separate letter to ~~DEI McCone~~,
Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret
Service that the CIA had disseminated several reports or
communications concerning the assassination to the Secret
Service since November 22, 1964. Rankin requested copies of these
reports and other materials. ~~Three~~ ^{These materials included} ~~cables~~ ^{Three} ~~which~~ ^{which} ~~concerned~~ ^{originally identified}
the photograph of the individual ~~concerned~~ ^{by the Mexico City Station as}
~~Oswald~~ ^{which was} subsequently shown to Oswald's mother. *[Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc# - 3]*

Among the materials
disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26
dissemination ~~(PIRSE 177, 26 NOV 1964)~~ ^{CCIA DOC PIRSE 177, 26 NOV 1964}
a copy of which was transmitted to

the Secret Service. That cable concerned the Dork ~~Armas~~ ^{Armas}
conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic
surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the

assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. *Thus, the CIA*
John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances
surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission
of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

HSCA Classified ^{John} ~~Doc~~ (Scelso ^{5/16/78} ~~position~~, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964.

~~Through the Warren Commission~~ ^{had unknowingly requested} ~~access to~~ ^{a source of concern to the CIA} telephonic surveillance production' (as discussed in the preceding section), the ~~disclosure~~ ^{disclosure} of the photosurveillance operations, ~~to the Warren Commission had begun~~ ^{concern} to cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies ~~on the items~~ refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..." ^{CIA DOC FOIA # 579-25}
(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250) ~~5 March 64~~

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 ^(CIA DOC) (Dispatch, HMMA21612) ^{no date given} Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ^{to} Section and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). ^(CIA DOC, DISPATCH JFCA-10088) That dis- ^{15 July 1963} patch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. ^(Ibid, p 3 of attachment) The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City ^(CIA DOC) (Dispatch HMMW 11935) ^{insert 1 Sept 1963}

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI ^{recorded} was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. ^(CIA Doc, Memorandum of Harold Swenson, FOIA 68-270 5 May 1964) At that time, ~~Harold Swenson~~ ^{Joseph Langrock}, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, ^{reported} recorded the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

8. This ~~dispatch~~ ^{reported that:}
(over)

telligence Service officers. ^[IBID] Specifically, AMMUG-1 ^{was} had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told ^{Largosch} Swenson, as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." ^[IBID] ^{Largosch} Swenson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, ^{during January 1967} ^{presented to me within one month after the assassination} for Cuba. ^[IBID]

^{Largosch} On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. ^[CIA Doc FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 7 May 1964] Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. ^[IBID]

On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's know-
ledge of the Oswald case. ^{Langosch} [IBID, attach. 5] Swenson paraphrased AMMUG's
knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald... [IBID]

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG. ^{SCIA DOC FOIA 687-295, Rocca memorandum, 11 May 1964} Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. ^{ET bid p. 23} (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA 687-295 with 4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. ^[CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, Helms memorandum 15 May 1964] Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of ^{Langosch's} Swenson's May 5 memorandum. ^{ET bid} (Helms' memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294).

In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ^{were} ~~are~~ set forth. However, that attachment ^{makes} ~~make~~ no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to ^{access to} ~~look at~~ the questions used in ^{Langosch's} Swenson's interrogation of AMMUG. ^[CIA Doc FOIA 739-3] ~~Dooley~~ memo ^{endum} ~~to Rocca~~, 19 June 1964 ~~FOIA 739-310~~. On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw ^{Langosch's} Swenson's May 5 memorandum. The only mention of ~~Calderon~~ ^{Calderon} was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." ^{ET bid} However, Willens was not shown the ^{Langosch's} Swenson memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible